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Abstract 
Our survey reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on all alternative policies to 
promote the deployment of new fiber-based communications infrastructure. Since such 
investment is expected to induce substantial positive externalities, dynamic efficiency 
becomes a particularly important policy goal. The available policies refer to i) different 
kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations including cost-based access regulations as 
well as softer regulations such as regulatory holidays or geographically differentiated 
regulations, ii) deregulatory approaches based on effective competition law 
implementation and competitive market structures including allowance of co-investment 
models, and iii) public subsidies to cover non-profitable (“white”) areas. Our survey 
identifies the most significant research gaps, finding that numerous studies related to the 
impact of access regulations exist, whereas only a much smaller branch of literature 
addresses the impact of competition policies, and even fewer studies analyze the impact 
of public subsidies on new communications deployment. Moreover, our work allows for a 
generic framework for policy recommendations that identifies the comparative advantages 
of the individual policy options for different market structures and for varying degrees of 
externalities. We find that public subsidies are the dominant policy alternative in white 
areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or “grey” areas, 
where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment. 
Deregulatory policies might be preferable in grey areas, if there is sufficient pressure from 
competitive outside options and if competition law is strong. Finally, deregulatory policies 
including soft regulation are the dominant policy in “black” areas, where several 
independent infrastructure operators exist.  
[1] 
1 Introduction and motivation  
Fibre-deployment of broadband access networks (“Next Generation Access (Networks)” – 
NGA(N)) have become a major issue for sector-specific regulators, competition authorities, 
national and local governments, as well as for investing firms. Operators of copper- and 
coax-based (“first generation”) broadband networks have to speed up their networks to 
fulfil needs for high-bandwidth demanding services and are confronted with an increasing 
capacity demand of mobile operators who are subject to an explosion of mobile 
broadband services (“apps”). Moreover, proponents of a broad-scale roll-out refer to the 
general purpose technology character (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995) of NGAN and 
related spill-over effects towards major economic sectors. Indeed, numerous studies 
provide evidence for the positive impact of telecommunications infrastructure in general 
and of first-generation broadband infrastructure in particular on employment, productivity 
and economic growth.1 Against this background, proponents of a broad-scale fibre-
deployment argue that NGAN create new jobs in ICT and other related industries and 
involves a huge potential for productivity increases. For instance, new ways of working, 
reduced travel and office rental costs, better time management, more innovation and 
increased competitiveness for businesses might emerge. These potential societal benefits 
of NGAN have, in recent years, induced substantial theoretical and empirical research.  
However, as market conditions appear to be insufficient in most countries so far to trigger 
broad-scale NGA roll-outs in view of high investment requirements (FTTH Council Europe, 
2012) and risks,2 identifying the right policy measures becomes crucial. Given that 
investment in NGAN and a higher related level of adoption of NGA-based broadband 
services are welfare enhancing3 and given that most regulatory frameworks aim at 
achieving infrastructure- (or facility-) based competition, dynamic efficiency becomes 
particularly important. The question thus arises how policy makers can incentivize 
                                                            
1 See inter alia Röller and Waverman (2001), Koutroumpis (2009) and Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and 
Wößmann (2011) for the impact on GDP growth, Garbacz and Thompson (2007) for the impact on global 
productive efficiency, Bertschek, Cerquera and Klein (2013) for the impact on firm performance and Etro 
(2009) for the impact on business creation and employment.  
2 Next to the risks associated with the intrinsic sunk cost nature of NGA investment, potential investors are 
confronted with the risk of unknown future demand for new services and regulatory risks due to uncertainty 
of future regulation of NGAN (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013).  
3 In principle, as shown in Höffler (2007), costs of infrastructure overcapacities might also outweigh the 
benefits of the new infrastructure. However, regarding ex ante NGA investment, the “Averch-Johnson” effect 
(too much capital employed) can be expected to be small because service-based as well as infrastructure-
based competition has already transformed legacy monopoly-like market structures into much more 
competitive market structures during the last two decades and migration towards NGA infrastructure 
constitutes typically more symmetric markets with new market players (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013) and thus 
even higher levels of competition. Moreover, as argued above, one can expect substantial positive 
externalities of NGA investment that are not captured in the markets.  
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investments most effectively. There is a considerable branch of literature that examines 
the impact of the different policy instruments available to public authorities, such as 
sector-specific regulation, antitrust/competition policy, and subsidies from national or 
regional/local governments. Based on a balanced reading of the related theoretical and 
empirical literature, we want to identify the impact of each of the relevant policy tools on 
NGA investment performance as well as the most relevant research gaps. These findings 
will then lead to much-needed policy recommendations in light of the perceived urgency of 
NGA deployment and in view of the huge variation of public policies as well as NGA 
investment activities in international comparison. For instance, while most of the fibre-
leading East-Asian countries take a state aid-driven approach, the U.S. adopted a 
deregulatory and primarily market-driven strategy a decade ago. The European Union (EU), 
in contrast, relies on competitive market forces but still foresees a set of ex ante access 
regulations to foster NGA investment. Switzerland, which is not part of the EU, actively 
promotes NGA deployment on the basis of co-investment models. Thus, it appears that 
policy makers experiment with different policy tools which will inter alia be attributable to 
country-specific characteristics but most likely also to missing, ambiguous or 
intransparent research results. 
This work aims to structure the overall discussion in terms of a meta-survey which is 
designed to be embracing and complementary to the existing and most related surveys in 
the telecommunications literature. Our work intends to first complement Cambini and 
Jiang (2009) who review the older and first-generation broadband related literature on 
investment and regulation. Second, our survey provides a broader (and more recent) 
review of policies than Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012)4 who focus on the 
theoretical literature investigating ex ante regulations and co-investment in the transition 
to NGAN. Thirdly, Balmer (2013) reviews the empirical and theoretical literature as well as 
regulatory practice in the EU member states but focussing only on geographic (de-
)regulation and cooperative investment in NGAN. Fourthly, Krämer and Schnurr (2014) 
provide a conceptual framework for analysing the impact of non-discriminatory open 
access policies on NGAN. Their literature review and framework encompasses mandatory 
open access regulations imposed on vertically integrated operators, public sector 
participation, co-investments and open access in the context of vertical separation and 
allows for a generic policy guideline to identify the most appropriate open access 
scenario. Finally, Vogelsang (2013) examines the future role of regulation in 
telecommunications based on five different policy areas (termination monopoly; local 
bottleneck access; net neutrality; spectrum management; universal service) in which the 
author also addresses their impact on NGA deployment. Vogelsang (2014) then surveys 
the same policy areas comparing the U.S. and EU telecommunications frameworks and 
examines whether these policies will eventually converge against the background of IP 
                                                            
4 As Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012, p. 400) indicate, most of their reviewed papers were unpublished 
due to the fact that policy issues were rather recent and new at that time.  
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convergence, NGAN and mobile broadband deployment combined with fixed-mobile 
substitution and fixed-mobile integration. 
Section 2 first provides a brief overview of the industry and outlines the NGA scenarios 
that are of relevance for our survey. The following sections then review the related 
theoretical and empirical literature on regulatory policies (section 3), competition policies 
(section 4) and public funding policies (section 5). Whereas sections 3 to 5 contain interim 
conclusions based on tabular summaries, the final section 6 provides some overall 
conclusions, develops a conceptual framework for policy recommendations and identifies 
an agenda for future research. As NGAN-roll-outs still represent a rather recent industry 
development and hence an even more recent research topic, it appears that a lot of further 
work on the theoretical and – even more so – on the empirical side still needs to be done. 
2 Industry background: Relevant NGA scenarios 
As outlined in the introduction, bandwidth of existing first-generation broadband networks 
is limited. In order to realise NGA characteristic connection speed and enable NGA specific 
applications, it is necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by 
placing the transmission equipment closer to the retail customers’ premises, e.g. in the 
cabinets which house distribution frames (referred to as “fibre to the curb/cabinet” 
(FTTC)). Even higher bandwidths can be achieved if the final copper-wire line is extended 
to or into the building (Fibre to the building (FTTB)). In cases where technical and economic 
considerations render it feasible to also renew or replace the remaining in-house wiring 
and hence to eliminate copper lines entirely, fibre can be directly deployed to the 
individual apartment or home (“fibre to the home” - FTTH) (Briglauer, 2014a, p. 55). In 
addition to these deployment scenarios, the roll-out of high-speed communications 
networks might also be realised by upgrading traditional cable television (CATV) networks 
with DOCSIS 3.0 technology and mobile broadband networks using the wireless 
communication standard “Long Term Evolution” (LTE). Although both last-mentioned 
technologies heavily rely on fibre in their backbone networks, only fibre coaxial 
cable/DOCSIS 3.0 currently has substantial coverage in access networks and high 
adoption rates. LTE might reach similar coverage and adoption in view of the enormous 
popularity of mobile apps and also compete in terms of quality of service levels with FTTC 
architecture in the mid-term and we will thus consider LTE as a relevant outside option.5 
                                                            
5 Note that even if LTE is not yet considered as a substitute product in the same relevant market, it still might 
exert significant competitive pressure on NGA based products; the same is true for first-generation wireline 
broadband services. Yoo (2014) shows that the LTE deployment took place much faster in the U.S. which is 
also ahead of Europe in terms of current LTE coverage. This might hold because Europe experienced higher 
coverage in terms of 3G(+) technologies and thus experiences a substantial replacement effect. 
[4] 
In the following sections we will use the generic term “fibre to the x” (FTTx) to refer to any 
of the wireline NGA scenarios described above.6  
3 Impact of sector-specific regulations 
The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets has established a 
broad system of (forward-looking) cost-based access pricing since the very beginning of 
the liberalisation process in 1997/1998. With respect to broadband services, alternative 
operators can rent the incumbent´s first-generation access infrastructure based on cost-
oriented wholesale charges (“unbundling”) and collocate their infrastructure at a 
switching office close to the subscriber. This allows service-based operators to provide 
traditional broadband services with scope for value added product features. Retail 
broadband services can also be provided via “bitstream” access which represents another 
wholesale service from the incumbent operator but at a more elementary level of the value 
chain. Entrants do not have to directly access the incumbent´s infrastructure, but they also 
have less ability to differentiate their services. Finally, broadband access via simple 
“resale” services means that access-seeking operators receive and resell a wholesale 
input of the incumbent without any scope of technological product differentiation. The 
U.S. regulator initially implemented a similar access regime, but began to fully reverse its 
– as regards unbundling even more comprehensive – regime imposed on the access 
network in 2002 (Vogelsang, 2014, 12-17). Unbundling obligations for fibre-based access 
were abolished in 2005. The regulatory regimes in broadband and fibre leading East-Asian 
economies are much more heterogeneous than those within the EU or in the U.S.  
With respect to emerging NGA infrastructure the EU framework currently foresees the most 
comprehensive and intense access obligations in intercontinental comparison. New 
wholesale fibre-based access products in the EU focus on so-called virtual-loop-
unbundling, which, in principle, should allow access similar to unbundling. However, the 
first implementing decisions of European regulators show that these new wholesale 
access products are actually much closer to previous bitstream access products and hence 
at a lower point of the value chain. Because the U.S. has been characterized by 
infrastructure-based duopoly competition since the initial stages of NGA deployment, the 
regulator refrained from imposing wholesale access remedies for NGA infrastructure ever 
since. Again, regulatory policies as regards NGA wholesale access differ significantly in 
                                                            
6 Notwithstanding this definition, deployment costs vary significantly between relevant NGA scenarios: Most 
notably, the average costs and the required investments of FTTH/B are disproportionately higher than for the 
other FTTx technologies, because the length of fiber lines is longer and thus services a smaller customer 
base in the last section (WIK, 2008). Jay, Neumann and Plückebaum (2013) examine the cost differences 
between high-end FTTH access network architectures based on Point-to-Point and Point-to-Multipoint 
topologies. 
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Asian countries, showing a similar or lower degree of regulatory interventionism compared 
to the EU framework (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013). 
Regarding the role of sector-specific regulations the most controversial questions 
therefore are whether the emerging NGA infrastructure should be subject to access 
regulations or whether “softer” regulations or deregulatory approaches (e.g., regulatory 
holidays, non-discrimination obligations, retail-minus pricing) should be granted (RQ(i)) 
and how existing broadband regulations, in particular the level of the access charges, 
impact migration incentives to NGAN (RQ(ii))? 
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 below, we review in ascending chronological order (within relevant 
sub-sections) the related theoretical and empirical literature.7 
3.1 Theoretical contributions 
We start by focusing i) on the impact of different regulatory regimes on investment 
incentives of both incumbent and entrant(s). Afterwards, we review ii) contributions 
analysing the impact of the level of the regulated access charge, given that cost-based 
access regulation has been imposed. For both questions, we will discuss the literature in 
chronological order. Complementing the well-cited survey by Cambini and Jiang (2009) on 
investment in broadband infrastructure, we focus on recent contributions which are 
related to NGA investment. 
(i) The impact of different regulatory regimes on investment incentives  
Klumpp and Su (2010) consider a general model of a vertically related industry where an 
upstream resource is owned by a vertically integrated incumbent, who is obliged to share 
this resource with downstream competitors at a charge set by the regulator. The 
incumbent may invest to improve the quality of the upstream resource, which may be 
interpreted as an NGA investment. In a risk-free environment, the authors show that 
revenue-neutral open access to the resource would be a better regulatory regime than 
regulatory holidays. However, this result is reversed under demand uncertainty.  
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) rank different regulatory regimes using the long run 
incremental costs (LRIC) as the regulatory benchmark model. In their model, the 
incumbent first decides about NGA investment while the demand for the new technology is 
uncertain. Afterwards, the incumbent competes in Cournot fashion with an entrant who 
may get access to the new technology due to regulation or negotiation. In a simulation-
based comparison of four different regulatory regimes, the authors find that regulatory 
holidays or a regime of fully distributed costs induce the highest investment, while an LRIC 
regime provides the lowest investment incentives. However, one essential element of their 
LRIC benchmark regime is that the incumbent operator may recoup investment outlays 
through access prices only if NGAN represent the most efficient access technology. 
                                                            
7 These sections build on the presentation in Briglauer and Frübing (2014). 
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Allowing joint investment in NGAN, which both incumbent and entrant can then use 
without paying a further access charge, generates intermediate investment incentives but 
the highest consumer surplus in the model. 
Cambini and Silvestri (2012) also compare different regulatory regimes concerning their 
impact on investment and welfare. Notable differences to the model of Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2011) include the determination of the access charge before quantities are set, 
qualitative differences between incumbent and entrant as well as the introduction of a 
dynamic setting. The authors focus on the timing of investment in a situation of demand 
uncertainty, rather than on the degree of investment. The regulatory regime of giving 
permission for joint investment with risk sharing emerges as the presumably best scheme 
for consumers and social welfare, while regulating access to the copper network but not to 
the NGAN induces the earliest investment. 
Inderst and Peitz (2014) consider a framework with a particular focus on the uncertainty of 
NGA investment. In a model where both firms are risk-neutral but only the incumbent may 
invest in a new technology with an increase of consumer utility of unknown magnitude, the 
authors evaluate a wide variety of possible access price policies, identifying 
countervailing effects and inefficiencies with policies that make usage by non-investing 
firms optional. The authors highlight that with risk averse firms, a variable access payment 
that increases in the number of subscribers shifts risk to the investing firm compared to a 
fixed payment, implying that a regulator should prefer a fixed payment if a balanced 
allocation of risk is desired. 
The main insight of Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2014) is that the regulator can improve 
the market outcome by setting regionally differentiated access charges. This is shown in a 
model with access regulation for both old and new technology, where the incumbent owns 
the old technology and may invest first in the new technology, with the entrant being able 
to demand access for the old technology. The investment costs differ across regions and 
the firms may invest in less expensive regions but not in expensive regions. Once any firm 
has invested in the new technology in a given region, the other can demand access to that 
technology for a regulated charge. The authors consider a regulatory regime where the 
access charge for the old technology differs depending on whether there has already been 
investment in the new technology in a particular region. While this regime would fail to 
completely solve the conflict between static efficiency in uncovered areas and the 
avoidance of excessive duplication of infrastructure costs, there would be an improvement 
over a regime with a single access charge in every region. 
(ii) The impact of the level of the regulated access charge  
The branch of the literature that assumes that some kind of cost-based access regulation 
is implemented, examines whether higher access charges imposed on old and/or new 
networks have a positive or negative impact on investment. 
[7] 
Vareda (2010) points out the role of different types of investment. The author builds a two-
firm model of a non-matured market with an integrated incumbent, an entrant in the retail 
market and a regulator whose only policy tool is setting the access charge for the 
incumbent’s legacy network. He finds that over a wide range of cost parameters a high 
access charge increases the incentives for the incumbent to invest in quality while 
reducing the incentives to invest in cost-reductions. However, there is a positive 
relationship between access charge and both types of investment if marginal costs of 
improving quality are low and there is a negative relationship for both types if the marginal 
costs of cost reductions are very low. There is no possibility for the entrant to undertake 
investments in this model and thus no proposition on his investment incentives. 
Vareda and Hoernig (2010) consider a model where both firms may invest. The focus in 
this paper is on the timing of an investment in a new infrastructure for which investment 
costs are decreasing over time. The firm which invests in NGAN first immediately has to 
give access to its rival at a regulated charge which is known ex ante. By allowing for a two-
part access charge, the authors are able to ensure that static efficiency is not affected by 
the transfer between the firms. The idea of delaying the second firm’s entry by means of 
giving cheaper access is prevented by the regulator who enforces that access is granted at 
exactly the pre-defined access charge. Both firms are ex ante symmetric in this model, but 
the firm which invests first can make higher profits for some time, because it benefits from 
the service-based competition instead of the facility-based competition which emerges 
later, once a second network becomes profitable due to further reduced investment costs. 
The authors show that in this model, higher access charges induce earlier investment, 
while low access charges can lead to a waiting equilibrium. 
Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010) show that the relationship between the access charge 
and investment incentives might not be monotone. The authors consider a model of an 
integrated incumbent who owns the old technology and competes with an entrant who 
may demand access for the old technology which remains to some extent competitive 
even after an investment in a new technology. The incumbent decides whether to invest in 
the new technology depending on the quality differential to the old technology and the 
regulated access charge for the old technology. There is no access regulation for the new 
technology, but the incumbent may offer an access contract for the new technology to the 
entrant. If there is an offer, the entrant chooses between the two technologies and both 
firms compete in the retail market. The authors find that investment incentives are the 
lowest for a medium access charge. Moreover, the incumbent voluntarily gives access to 
the new technology if the innovation is non-drastic, i.e. if the entrant could also compete 
sufficiently well with the old technology. In addition to the model just described, the 
authors also consider a version where both firms may invest in the new technology and 
find that investment would take place for a larger set of access charges than if only the 
incumbent could invest. In this model the entrant would be more likely to invest than the 
incumbent, but due the possibility of excessive duplication of investment costs the 
welfare effects are ambiguous. 
[8] 
Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) contribute to the debate by examining whether spillovers from 
investment of the incumbent to the product quality of the entrant play a role concerning 
the impact of the level of the access charge on investment. In the standard setting with an 
integrated incumbent who must provide access to its infrastructure in exchange for a 
regulated access charge, the authors introduce the possibility of a quality-boosting 
investment in a new technology which would be demand-enhancing. This is also to the 
benefit of the entrant. The authors assume that no binding ex ante regulation is possible 
and the incumbent therefore undertakes its investment decision while taking possible 
regulatory changes afterwards into account. The main finding of this paper is that 
depending on the cost structure there may be overinvestment or underinvestment from a 
welfare perspective.  
Inderst and Peitz (2012a) emphasize the asymmetries of telecommunications markets and 
find that higher or lower access charges might have a different impact on the incumbent 
and on the entrant. Using a reduced-form approach, the authors consider a strategic 
investment game between an incumbent owning the old technology and an entrant who 
has access to the old technology at a regulated charge. Assuming that both firms can 
invest in a new technology under the same conditions, the authors’ main finding is that a 
higher access charge would reduce the investment incentives of the incumbent but 
increase those of the entrant. The reduced-form approach of this paper does not allow for 
a conclusion on total welfare. 
Different results for the incumbent and the entrant concerning the impact of access 
charges on investment incentives are also found by Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012). 
The authors analyse a model in which both firms first rely on the incumbent’s copper 
network for which access is regulated. Both firms then decide sequentially on their 
investment in NGAN. The first-mover advantage for the incumbent is justified with the 
argument that the incumbent’s control over the old infrastructure facilitates the 
deployment of NGAN. There are regionally differentiated investment costs and it is 
possible to price-discriminate between regions. The authors identify two countervailing 
effects for the incumbent. On the one hand, the business migration effect suggests that a 
lower access charge would imply that prices charged for NGA services have to be rather 
low as well or customers would not switch, implying negative effects of the access charge 
for investment. On the other hand, there is the wholesale revenue effect, which describes 
how low access charges lead to lower cannibalization losses, implying positive effects of a 
low access charge on investment. This is because high investment by the incumbent 
triggers high investment by the entrant, resulting in a loss of wholesale revenues, but this 
loss is smaller with lower access charges. Overall, in this model the effect of a higher 
access charge on investment incentives is ambiguous for the incumbent, but clearly 
positive for the entrant as the availability of a cheap access increases opportunity costs of 
the entrant’s investment in new infrastructure. A further finding of the authors is that a 
decision to also regulate access for the new technology and not just for the old technology 
[9] 
as in the baseline model, would lead to less investment, even if both access charges are 
jointly optimized. 
The contribution by Bourreau, Cambini et al. (2014) was already mentioned in subsection 
(i). In addition, the authors also take a closer look at the interdependence of access 
charges for old and new technology, aiming to set them optimally from a benevolent 
regulator’s point of view. In an equilibrium where the incumbent has larger coverage for 
the new technology, both access charges should be positively correlated, while a negative 
correlation would be preferable if the entrant has larger coverage. 
Bourreau, Dogan and Lestage (2014) enrich the discussion by arguing that the entrant’s 
investment incentives do not only depend on the access charge for the old technology but 
also on other terms of access. This is examined in a model where the incumbent owns the 
infrastructure for the old technology, but the entrant has the options between building his 
own network or demanding access to the old network. The regulator can set an access 
scheme consisting of an access charge and a level of access which corresponds to the 
fraction of the incumbent’s infrastructure the entrant may use. The entrant has to invest in 
complementary network elements to which he cannot acquire access. Investment costs in 
this model are sunk and there are no economies of scale. Investment incentives of the 
incumbent are not considered. The authors find that a high level of access charge would 
induce accelerated market entry but also delay infrastructure investment by the entrant. 
This holds even for lower access charges. From a welfare point of view, the optimal access 
charge varies non-monotonically with the level of access. 
3.2 Empirical evidence 
The empirical literature on the impact of broadband access regulations can be divided into 
two broad categories: i) quantitative analyses focusing on the regulatory impact on NGA 
investment and ii) quantitative analyses focusing on the impact on NGA adoption.8 Due to 
data availability several of the empirical studies refer to measures of adoption. Adoption 
can proxy for investment and, at the same time, might provide a better proxy for consumer 
welfare9 in efficiently functioning markets (Crandall, Jeffrey & Ingraham 2013, p. 266). 
(i) The impact of regulation on investment  
Minamihashi (2012) examines whether unbundling regulations imposed on the Japanese 
incumbent operator prevent entrants from self-deploying new infrastructure in terms of 
NGA cable deployment based on DOCSIS 3.0. The author employs data for Japan at the 
municipal level for the years from 2005 to 2009. Based on a dynamic entry game the 
author employs instrumental variable probit and nested likelihood estimation techniques 
                                                            
8 A comprehensive overview of qualitative studies can be found in Berkman Center (2010, pp. 121-136).  
9 In most regulatory frameworks consumer welfare is at the heart of the relevant jurisdictions. See for 
instance the policy objectives and regulatory principles specified in Article 8, paragraph 2 (a) of the 
framework directive (European Commission 2002). 
[10] 
and finds that unbundling regulations hinder cable entrants from investing in own NGA 
infrastructure. During the years analysed the incumbent’s NGA investments, however, are 
not hindered by the unbundling regulations.  
Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler (2013) investigate the determinants of NGA investment in 
terms of homes passed by FTTx connections using data for the years from 2005 to 2011. 
Their empirical specification incorporates EU27 country-level data where estimates are 
obtained through various dynamic panel methods. Applying different GMM estimators as 
well as a bias-corrected fixed-effects estimation technique explicitly accounts for the 
endogeneity bias arising from their dynamic investment specification. The authors find 
that the more effective wholesale broadband access regulation and hence service-based 
competition is, the more negative is the impact on NGA investment. Competitive pressure 
from cable and mobile networks affects NGA investment non-linearly in terms of an 
inverted U-shape.10 Furthermore, using a partial adjustment model the authors show that 
the NGA deployment process is subject to inherent inertia due to adjustment costs. 
Yoo (2014) also examines the impact of service- and facility-based competition on NGA 
investment controlling for standard cable coverage using a recent but small sized panel 
data set for annual data for the U.S. and selected European countries. The author 
estimates a static investment equation using weighted least squares and ordinary least 
squares regression techniques that control for period effects. The author finds that 
service-based competition has a statistically significant negative correlation with total 
NGA investment as well as with rural NGA investment. 
Bacache, Bourreau and Gaudin (2014) examine the incentives embedded in the EU 
regulatory framework on migration from old to new access infrastructures using biannual 
data from 15 European member states over the period from July 2002 to July 2010. The 
authors relate the number of access lines based on new access technologies to the 
number of unbundling and bitstream lines in order to test the validity of the so-called 
“ladder of investment” hypothesis (Cave and Vogelsang 2003; Cave 2006).11 The authors 
estimate a dynamic adoption equation using a difference-GMM estimator. Whereas the 
authors find some support for the ladder of investment hypothesis for the migration from 
bitstream access to local loop unbundling at the lower rungs of the ladder, there is no 
empirical support for the hypothesis that the presence of multi-layer access regulation to 
local loop unbundling fosters entrants to invest in NGA infrastructures. 
                                                            
10 However, as argued in Schmutzler and Sacco (2011) there is generally no clear prediction on non-linear 
shapes in partial equilibrium analysis. Rather, the relationship depends on the definition of the competitive 
intensity and the oligopoly framework. Indeed, a related and more recent empirical study by Briglauer 
(2014b) which employs a bigger sample size does not find evidence for a non-linear relationship. Hence, the 
earlier result in Briglauer et al. (2013) might also be attributed to the fact that polynomial terms show good 
in-sample fit but lower out of-sample validity. 
11 Among new access technologies the authors include FTTx as well as connections based on Power-line 
communication and wireless local loop. 
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(ii) The impact of regulation on adoption  
Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) are the first to estimate the effects of broadband access 
regulation on FTTx connections with data from EU27 countries for the years from 2002 to 
2007. Hence, this work covers the NGA roll-out at the very early stage. The authors employ 
a static adoption equation which is estimated by several forms of two-way fixed effects 
regressions. The authors find that countries where unbundled local loops or bitstream 
unbundling is more effective experience lower FTTx adoption. In turn, infrastructure-based 
competition from DSL and CATV networks exerts a positive impact on FTTx adoption.  
Samanta, Martin, Guild and Pan (2012) examine the demand-side determinants of high-
speed broadband deployment using ITU and OECD data on the number of FTTx connections 
for 25 countries for the years from 1999 to 2009. The authors estimate static specifications 
of an adoption model using generalized-least-squares regression technique. The authors 
employ a dummy variable to capture the extent of unbundling regulation and find that this 
variable has no significant impact on NGA adoption.  
Jeanjean (2013) investigates the impact of copper access regulation in terms of both 
unbundling access charges and the share of wholesale access lines to the total number of 
retail DSL lines using quarterly data covering 15 European countries for the years from 
2007 to 2012. He specifies static and dynamic models which are estimated using two-way 
fixed effects regression technique. The author finds that tight copper access regulation 
diminishes migration towards FTTx-based broadband services.  
Briglauer (2014a) investigates the determinants of NGA adoption based on FTTx 
subscriptions for EU27 member states for the years from 2004 to 2013. The author 
estimates static and dynamic model specifications using fixed-effects estimators 
including a bias-corrected version for estimating a dynamic diffusion model. He finds that 
stricter previous broadband regulations in terms of unbundling, bitstream and resale 
obligations have a negative impact, while competitive pressure from first-generation 
broadband and mobile networks affects NGA adoption according to an inverted U-shape. 
Regarding the dynamics of the adoption process, the author also finds evidence for 
substantial network effects that give rise to a self-propelling endogenous growth process. 
3.3 Conclusions on regulatory policies 
Table 1 summarizes the main assumptions and findings of the theoretical literature 
reviewed in section 3.1. Regarding the impact of different regulatory regimes on incentives 
of incumbent and entrant to invest in NGA (RQ (i)), the theoretical literature considers 
mainly two different settings, namely one in which only the incumbent can invest and one 
in which both firms can invest but the incumbent is first-mover. For both settings, less 
restrictive access regulation, for instance the permission of risk-sharing and cooperation 
models, regionally differentiated access charges or temporary regulatory holidays in 
conjunction with voluntary access provision is suggested to improve social welfare (only 
Nitsche & Wiethaus, 2011) as well as to induce more NGA investment compared to more 
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restrictive regulatory regimes like cost-based access regulation. Given that cost-based 
access regulation is in place, the literature studies the impact of higher or lower access 
charges on investment both in settings where only the incumbent may invest in NGA and 
where both firms may invest. Important aspects in which the papers also differ include 
whether two-part tariffs are allowed, whether spillovers occur, to which extent the old 
technology remains competitive and how the investment costs are modelled. In general, 
the literature is suggesting that a higher access charge for the old technology is 
encouraging NGA investment by the entrant. However, there are countervailing effects for 
the incumbent suggesting ambiguity whether a higher or lower access is more likely to 
induce NGA investment by the incumbent and hence also with respect to aggregate NGA 
investment. 
Table 2 summarizes the findings as well as the data and methodology employed in the 
empirical literature reviewed in section 3.2. From the empirical literature we infer that all 
studies that employ EU data or data from European countries find a negative impact of ex 
ante access regulations or related service-based competition on NGA deployment in terms 
of FTTx investment or FTTx adoption. Only one study that uses OECD and ITU data for FTTx 
adoption finds insignificant results (Samanta et al., 2012). Whereas all these studies use 
aggregate country level data, one study makes use of Japanese data at the municipal level 
and also finds that unbundling regulations have a negative impact on entrants´ incentive 
to invest in NGA infrastructure. The empirical literature overall indicates a negative impact 
of ex ante access regulations on dynamic efficiency in terms of NGA investment incentives 
(RQ(i) and RQ(ii)). These results seem to favour deregulatory approaches. In a similar vein, 
Vogelsang (2013, p. 215) concludes that emphasising dynamic efficiency shifts the 
regulatory frontier towards “softer regulation, cooperative investment, and deregulation or 
regulatory holidays”. This appears to be largely in line with the older broadband related 
literature as surveyed in Cambini and Jiang (2009, p. 571) who summarize the empirical 
analysis as follows: “The majority concludes that local loop unbundling based on forward-
looking cost methodology discourages both ILECs [=Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers] 
and CLECs [=Competitive Local Exchange Carriers] from investing in networks.” At the 
same time the authors concede that a large part of the empirical analysis lacks reasonable 
time-series data which weakens the results. However, subsequent empirical analysis on 
regulation and broadband investment12 as well as the NGA related studies reviewed in 
                                                            
12 See inter alia Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven (2010), Grajek and Röller (2011) or Crandall et al. (2013). 
Gruber and Koutroumpis (2013), however, show that wholesale access regulations increase DSL investment. 
Their result could imply that incumbent DSL infrastructure exerts a substantial replacement effect which 
diminishes NGA investment incentives. Briglauer (2014a) provides some evidence by showing that the 
replacement effect indeed exists in Western European countries with well-established DSL infrastructure 
whereas there is no replacement effect in Central European countries (that do not exhibit first-generation 
infrastructure that is nearly the same in terms of coverage and quality). 
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section 3.2 seem to reemphasize the results in Cambini and Jiang (2009) and that their 
finding carries over – apparently even more strongly – to NGA infrastructure. 
Table 1: Theoretical analysis on regulatory policies 
Author(s) Main assumptions Main results
The impact of different regulatory regimes on investment incentives – RQ(i): 
Klumpp & 
Su  
(2010) 
Only incumbent may invest. Linear 
access charge available for 
downstream entrants. 
 In a risk-free environment revenue-neutral open 
access policy fosters incumbent investments in 
quality and downstream competition 
 Result is reversed under demand uncertainty 
Nitsche & 
Wiethaus  
(2011)  
Both firms may invest. Incumbent 
is first-mover. Uncertain demand. 
 Regulatory holidays and fully distributed costs 
regimes allow highest investment, LRIC regulation 
the lowest  
 Regulatory holidays produce lowest consumer 
surplus, while risk sharing produces highest 
consumer surplus but mid investment incentives 
Cambini & 
Silvestri  
(2012) 
Only incumbent may invest. Ex 
ante access regulation for both 
technologies. Uncertain demand. 
 Risk sharing leads to best consumer and social 
welfare  
 Investment is always undertaken later than the 
social optimum timing but access regulation 
restricted to the old network allows the earliest 
investment 
Inderst & 
Peitz 
(2014) 
Only incumbent may invest. 
Uncertain extra utility created by 
the investment. Different versions 
of ex ante access contracts (with or 
without commitment) as well as ex 
post access contracts are 
considered. 
 Identifies forces of play for different scenarios 
Access policies with opt-out possibility – after 
uncertainty is resolved – must ensure option is used 
efficiently 
 Fixed payments optimal, if balanced risk allocation 
is desired and given no late-entry and/or foreclosure 
is feasible 
Bourreau, 
Cambini et 
al. 
(2014) 
latory Ecs may invest. Incumbent is 
first-mover. Investment costs differ 
among regions. Access regulation 
for both technologies. 
 Regulator can improve market outcome by setting 
regionally differentiated access charges 
 Ex ante regulation to NGA infrastructure may yield 
even better outcomes 
 Access charge imposed on NGAN and on old 
technology should be positively correlated if 
incumbent dominates NGA investments 
The impact of the height of the cost-oriented access charge on investment incentives – RQ(ii): 
Vareda  
(2010) 
Incumbent may invest in quality-
upgrading and/or cost-reduction. 
Regulated access charge, entrant 
cannot invest. 
 High access charge boosts investment in quality but 
reduces incentive in cost-reduction 
 Access charge and both types of investment are 
positively correlated when marginal cost of quality-
upgrading is low 
 With low marginal cost, correlation is reversed 
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Author(s) Main assumptions Main results
The impact of the height of the cost-oriented access charge on investment incentives – RQ(ii): 
Vareda & 
Hoernig  
(2010) 
Two ex ante symmetric firms 
which may both invest. First 
investor has to give access at 
regulated two-part tariff. 
Investment costs decline over 
time. 
 Higher access charges induce earlier investments 
 Under preemption equilibrium the result is reversed, 
if reduction in payoffs is the determinant factor 
 Low access charges lead to waiting equilibrium 
 First-best investment cannot be achieved, but 
efficiency can be improved 
Brito et al. 
(2010) 
Incumbent may invest in new 
technology and then may give 
access. Two part-access tariff. Old 
technology remains competitive. 
 Two-part access tariffs incentivize investments for 
low values of cost 
 Investment incentives are lowest for a medium 
access charge 
 If regulator commits to a regulatory policy, regulatory 
moratorium may be socially optimal 
Mizuno & 
Yoshino  
(2012) 
Only incumbent may invest in 
quality, entrant may benefit of 
spillovers, if incumbent invests. 
Access charge is set after 
investment. 
 Depending on the cost structure there may be 
overinvestment or underinvestment from a welfare 
perspective 
Inderst & 
Peitz  
(2012a) 
Both firms may invest in new 
technology. Various scenarios 
regarding asymmetry of firms, 
access tariffs, price-dependency 
of demand and further usage of 
old technology. 
 Higher access charge does not incentivize 
incumbent’s investment but increases entrant’s one 
 No conclusions on total welfare 
Bourreau, 
Cambini & 
Dogan 
(2012) 
Both firms may invest. Incumbent 
is first-mover. Investment costs 
vary across regions. Old 
technology remains competitive. 
No access regulation for new 
technology. 
 High access charge incentivizes entrant's 
investment but has ambiguous effects on 
incumbent's one 
 Ex ante regulated access to NGAN negatively affects 
investment 
 If both networks are regulated, access charges must 
be treated dependently 
Bourreau, 
Cambini et 
al.  
(2014) 
Both firms may invest. Incumbent 
is first-mover. Investment costs 
vary across regions. Old 
technology remains competitive. 
Access regulation for both 
technologies. 
 If the incumbent has larger NGA coverage, it is 
socially optimal that access charges are positively 
correlated, negatively correlated in the other case 
Bourreau, 
Dogan et al.  
(2014) 
Only entrants´ investment is 
considered. In addition to an 
access charge, a level of access is 
set. 
 High access charge incentivizes service-based 
competition if a small up-front investment for entry 
is required, but delays facility-based entry 
 Multiple access levels may delay investment  
 High access charges may accelerate investments, 
when allowing for market experience and/or market 
share acquisition 
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Table 2: Empirical analysis on regulatory policies 
Author(s) Data & period Methodology Main results
Quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on NGA investments – RQ(i):  
Minamihashi 
(2012) 
Japan 
2005-2009 
Municipal-level 
Instrumental variable 
probit and nested 
likelihood estimation 
regression. 
 Unbundling regulations hinder cable 
entrants from investing in own NGA 
infrastructure 
Briglauer et 
al.  
(2013) 
EU27 countries 
2005-2011 
Country-level 
Generalized method of 
moments estimators; 
bias corrected fixed 
effects regression; 
dynamic investment 
equation. 
 The more effective is service-based 
competition, the more negative is the 
impact on NGA investment 
 Infrastructure-based competition from 
cable and mobile networks affects NGA 
investment non-linearly 
 Evidence of adjustment costs 
Yoo 
(2014) 
U.S. and 
European 
countries 
55 observations 
Country-level 
Weighted least squares 
and ordinary least 
squares regression; 
static investment model 
with period effects. 
 Service-based competition and NGA 
investment are negatively correlated 
 Infrastructure-based competition from 
cable networks is positively correlated 
with NGA investment 
Bacache et 
al.  
(2014)  
15 European 
countries 
17 semesters  
2002-2010 
Country-level 
Generalized methods of 
moments estimators 
using dynamic 
regression models. 
 Ladder of investment hypothesis 
supported at lower rungs 
 Presence of multi-layer access 
regulation to local loop unbundling 
does not increase NGA adoption 
Quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on NGA adoption – RQ(i): 
Wallsten & 
Hausladen 
(2009) 
EU countries, 
Japan and South 
Korea 
2002-2007 
Country-level 
Static adoption equation 
using two-way fixed 
effects regression. 
 The more effective is unbundled local 
loops or bitstream unbundling, the 
lower is NGA adoption 
 Infrastructure-based competition has a 
positive impact on NGA adoption 
Samanta et 
al.  
(2012) 
ITU/OECD 
25 countries 
1999-2009 
Country-level 
Generalized least 
squares and three stage 
least squares regression, 
static and dynamic 
adoption models. 
 Unbundling regulation has no 
significant impact on NGA adoption 
Briglauer 
(2014a) 
EU27 countries 
2004-2012 
Country-level 
Static and dynamic 
models using ordinary 
and bias corrected fixed-
effects regression. 
 Wholesale broadband regulation 
lowers NGA adoption 
 Infrastructure-based competition from 
first-generation broadband and mobile 
networks affects NGA adoption non-
linearly 
 Network effects lead to an endogenous 
NGA adoption process 
Quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on NGA adoption – RQ(ii): 
Jeanjean 
(2013) 
15 European 
countries 
2007-2012 
Country-level 
Static and dynamic 
models using two-way 
fixed effects regression.  
 Tight copper access regulation 
decreases speed of NGA adoption 
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4 Impact of competition policies 
To the extent that investment in NGAN is deemed welfare enhancing, the emphasis on 
dynamic efficiency results in a more deregulatory frontier involving a switch from ex ante 
regulation towards policies that lie in the intersection of ex ante and ex post authorities. 
Cooperative investment has increasingly received attention as a means of avoiding 
inefficient infrastructure duplication, sharing investment risks and thus inducing 
investment incentives and at the same time allowing for competition. One possibility 
refers to private co-operations in the actual building and sharing of infrastructure. Co-
operating partners usually are telecommunications service providers (across the value 
chain), other public utilities (most notably, energy utilities) or real estate developers.13 In 
Switzerland for instance, market-based agreements between the incumbent operator 
“Swisscom” and local utility companies guarantee mutual access to fibre infrastructure in 
different geographical areas (Neumann, 2010, pp. 14-16) without any mandatory fibre 
access obligations; this policy scenario can be regarded as a full substitute to sector-
specific ex ante access regulations. Competition in emerging NGA markets will be 
determined by the number of co-investing firms and by whether mandatory access 
obligations co-exist as a competitive safe-guard or whether cooperative investments are 
exempted entirely from ex ante regulations. In the last case a strict supervision of ex post 
competition authorities becomes necessary to forestall potential collusion between co-
investing operators (Vogelsang, 2013, pp. 216-217).14 It should be noted here that reliance 
on competition law as a substitute policy crucially hinges upon its institutional 
implementation and effectiveness which varies considerably in international comparison. 
Whereas the governments of most of the leading East-Asian fibre nations show a high 
degree of interventionism in terms of coordinating ICT development since the very 
beginning of broadband deployment, the EU in recent recommendations provided the 
opportunity for firms to co-ordinate and cooperate.15 Moreover, European regulators 
increasingly introduced geographical deregulation acknowledging the development of 
infrastructure competition and as a tool for incentivizing investment in NGAN (Balmer, 
2013). This section also covers the U.S.-style fully unregulated actual and potential 
competition between infrastructure-based NGA operators. Most notably, the incumbent´s 
legacy broadband infrastructure is confronted with infrastructure-based competition from 
CATV network operators that can serve around 95% of the U.S. population. The 
                                                            
13 For the involvement of public entities and the impact of public subsidies in particular, the reader is referred 
to the discussion in Section 5. 
14 Indeed, collusion cannot be precluded a priori, because business case scenarios indicate that NGA co-
investment is sustainable only for a limited number of operators (Rendon Schneir & Xiong, 2013).  
15 Most notably, the reader is referred to the Commission´s NGA recommendation (European Commission, 
2010, recitals 12, 15, 19, 27, art. 13, 16).  
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deregulation of broadband infrastructure in 2002/2005 was largely based on the view that 
infrastructure duopoly was deemed sufficient to guarantee effective competition 
(Vogelsang, 2014, pp. 3, 14).  
In the sections below we take a broad view that includes all relevant cooperation and 
deregulatory scenarios. We want to examine whether cooperation models induce 
additional NGA investment or not (RQ(i)) and whether deregulatory U.S. style policies 
induce additional NGA investment or not (RQ(ii)).  
In sections 4.1 and 4.2 below, we review in ascending chronological order (within relevant 
sub-sections) the related theoretical and empirical literature. 
4.1 Theoretical contributions 
Do cooperation models induce additional NGA investment or not (RQ (i))?  
The first paper analysing RQ (i) is Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011). The authors rank different 
regulatory regimes as described in section 3.1. According to their model, allowing joint 
investment in NGA deployment, which both incumbent and entrant can use without further 
access charge, generates intermediate investment incentives but the highest consumer 
surplus in their model. 
Inderst and Peitz (2012b) examine the advantages of joint investment looking from a more 
general perspective at access contracts, either enforced by the regulator or mutually 
agreed between incumbent and entrant. Both ex ante and ex post contracts with respect to 
the time of the investment are considered in an initially symmetric Hotelling duopoly 
model. The authors find that both types of contracts can incentivize roll-out of NGAN and 
mitigate the problem of investment duplication, while ex ante contracts are more efficient 
in doing so. However, both types of contracts, but particularly ex ante contracts, may be 
used to weaken competition.  
Cambini and Silvestri (2012), whose model we already described in section 3.1, also 
consider the regulatory regime of giving permission for joint investment with risk sharing. 
This emerges as the presumably best regulatory scheme for consumers and social welfare, 
while regulating access to the copper network but not to the NGAN induces the earliest 
investment. 
Cambini and Silvestri (2013) extend their earlier model by introducing a joint venture 
between the incumbent and the entrant with transfers based on the difference to the case 
where the incumbent would invest alone. Moreover, the authors introduce a third 
company, which has the option to request access to the NGAN at a charge which is 
determined by either the regulator or the co-investing firms after the investment decision. 
The authors find that basic investment sharing is most likely preferable to allowing a joint 
venture, a result which also holds if there is a third firm outside the sharing agreement. 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2013) assess the extent of potential benefits from joint 
investments of two incumbents in NGA infrastructure by comparing the situation of joint 
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investment to simple duplication of investments. The authors identify a trade-off between 
advantages of joint investment, particularly lower costs per firm, and disadvantages, 
especially the danger that collaboration upstream leads to tacit collusion downstream. 
The latter problem may be avoided by access obligations but then the possibility of a 
third-party entry negatively effects co-investment. The strength of these effects is 
evaluated in a model with demand uncertainty and investment costs that differ across 
regions. The authors find that co-investment is more likely to provide an improvement if 
costs savings from the joint investment are high or if service differentiation between the 
incumbents is not too low. Voluntary access provision is seen as providing a larger 
infrastructure but less competition. 
Do deregulatory U.S. style policies induce additional NGA investment or not (RQ(ii))?  
With Vareda (2011) we are leading over to RQ (ii), discussing the impact of deregulatory 
policies. The author deals with the decision of the entrant to compete service-based or 
facility-based in a setting where the incumbent first decides how much to upgrade his 
network. The entrant also takes into account a two-part access tariff set by the regulator 
and may decide to start as a service-based competitor and build a bypass network later. 
The author finds that a higher initial investment of the incumbent delays the entrant’s 
investment in a bypass network. He suggests that the regulator set an access charge 
depending on investment quality corresponding to the strength of the business-stealing 
effect of quality upgrades. Given the assumption that the investment costs of the entrant 
are declining over time due to technological progress, the author notes that deregulation 
could be better for society than access regulation. 
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) – reviewed in section 3.1 – find that regulatory holidays lead 
to highest investment incentives dominating joint investment and an LRIC regime. 
Flacher and Jennequin (2014) consider a multi-firm model with old and new access 
networks co-existing as imperfect substitutes. Access to the old technology is available for 
all firms at a cost-oriented access charge, while one type of operators faces opportunities 
to roll-out an NGAN and one type can only use the new network given sufficiently attractive 
access opportunities. The authors show that in their setting an unregulated situation 
provides higher welfare than ex post access price regulation. However, the authors show 
that NGA investment and social welfare are highest if both investment and access charge 
decisions are taken by a fully informed and benevolent regulator.  
4.2 Empirical evidence 
To the best of our knowledge, there are currently no studies that employ quantitative 
analysis utilizing NGA specific data. Therefore, we will consider NGA-related papers which 
provide qualitative or experimental evidence. 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2010) consider national FTTH plans in France, Portugal 
and Italy, finding that all three countries at this time were planning to allow cooperation 
between competitors while only France intended to regulate cooperative agreements. The 
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authors argue that evaluating ex ante which regulatory policy would be most efficient is 
not feasible, as additional and necessary evidence on the performance in practice can 
only be gathered if countries adopt different policies at least in the beginning.  
Yoo (2014) compares NGA and LTE statistics in the U.S. with selected European countries 
using recent data from the European Commission as well as from the U.S. government. The 
author finds that the U.S. is far ahead of Europe in terms of total and rural coverage. In 
addition, he finds that the difference between the U.S. and European per household NGA 
coverage has increased following the financial crisis in 2008. He argues that his findings 
suggest that U.S. style deregulatory policies have been more effective than the approach 
under the EU regulatory framework.  
Experimental evidence is provided by Krämer and Vogelsang (2012) who study a network 
competition game which assumes that firms first have to invest in a new infrastructure 
before they compete in offering a new service to one metropolitan, one urban and one 
rural area which differ in costs. Access regulation is foreseen which applies locally if the 
network is monopolized in a particular area only. For this general setting, the authors 
consider various scenarios, which differ for instance by whether co-investment is possible 
or by whether cheap talk about the investment decision is allowed. The experiment was 
conducted with economics students who had passed comprehension test before being 
allowed to participate. The results show that co-investment did not result in higher 
coverage, because there was a higher likelihood of tacit collusion between co-investing 
companies, despite market share asymmetry between firms which was created in order to 
hinder tacit collusion.  
Experimental evidence is also provided by Henze, Noussair and Willems (2012), who 
evaluate regulatory holidays for new capacity, simple price cap regulation and price cap 
regulation with long term contracts and a secondary market in a setting with a single 
network operator and several other firms bidding in an auction for capacity. After acquiring 
the capacity, firms sell in a downstream market where aggregate demand is known but 
individual demand is private information. The network operator faces the challenge that 
installed capacity is causing costs every period once it is installed regardless of usage 
while there is no possibility to dismantle. With regard to the ability of generating efficient 
capacity investment, the authors find that the simple price cap regime is the most efficient 
regulatory policy, while the other two regimes induce underinvestment in the experiment. 
4.3 Conclusions on competition policies 
Table 3 summarizes the main assumptions and findings of the theoretical literature 
reviewed in section 4.1. The impact of co-investment models on NGA investment (RQ (i)) is 
usually studied in a setting where both incumbent and entrant may invest on their own or 
form an alliance upstream. The literature identifies gains from co-investment models, in 
particular the avoidance of unnecessary duplication costs provided that product 
differentiation is sufficiently high. The drawback, from a welfare perspective, is that 
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upstream cooperation may lead to downstream collusion. The natural reaction by the 
regulator would be to enforce access for non-co-investing parties, but this would reduce 
the incentive for NGA investment. Overall, the theoretical literature is suggesting that co-
investment models improve NGA coverage in comparison to the situation where only 
traditional cost-based access regulation is in place, while there is disagreement on 
whether other regulatory regimes could lead to even higher coverage. For deregulatory 
approaches (RQ (ii)), the available papers suggest that (temporary) deregulation could 
lead to higher investment and might be especially beneficial for society when investment 
costs are decreasing over time.  
Table 4 summarizes the methodology, setting and main findings of the empirical literature 
reviewed in section 4.2. Since there is only a very limited amount of empirical data 
available with respect to NGA specific approaches like allowing co-investment models 
(RQ(i)) or the introduction of regulatory holidays (RQ(ii)), we had to consider qualitative 
and experimental evidence. Several regulatory authorities including France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal and Switzerland have allowed firms to co-invest in NGA infrastructure, but 
no clear evaluation is feasible yet. The experimental evidence casts some doubt on the 
positive view of co-investments in the theoretical literature, as both co-investment and 
regulatory holidays were not found to lead to higher NGA coverage in the experimental 
studies. For co-investment, this is explained with the strong effect of tacit collusion which 
was facilitated by the cooperation upstream. The underinvestment in case of regulatory 
holidays is caused by the incentive to exploit market power in the new market by reducing 
supply for the NGA product. 
Balmer (2013, pp. 55-56) concludes that basic investment sharing models might represent 
a valid alternative to traditional access obligations. Regulators, however, define ex ante 
which co-investment models warrant deregulation under which external circumstances. 
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Table 3: Theoretical analysis on competition policies 
Author(s) Main assumptions Main results
The impact of co-investment models on investment incentives – RQ(i): 
Nitsche & 
Wiethaus  
(2011) 
Both firms may investment. 
Incumbent is first-mover. Uncertain 
demand. 
 Investment incentives with risk-sharing are 
lower than with regulatory holidays or fully 
distributed costs, but higher than with cost-
based regulation 
 Investment risk sharing leads to highest 
consumer surplus 
Inderst & 
Peitz 
(2012b) 
Symmetric duopoly. Access 
contracts may be mutually agreed 
or enforced by regulator ex ante or 
ex post. Mutually agreed ex ante 
contracts are interpreted as co-
investment. 
 Ex ante and ex post access contracts lead to 
fewer duplication of investments and to a 
wider roll-out 
 Ex ante and ex post access contracts 
dampen competition 
Cambini & 
Silvestri 
(2012) 
Only incumbent may invest. Ex 
ante regulation for both 
technologies. Uncertain demand. 
 Risk sharing leads to best consumer and 
social welfare  
 Even with risk-sharing, investment is 
undertaken later than socially optimal 
Cambini & 
Silvestri 
(2013) 
Incumbent and entrant may share 
investment risk or form a joint 
venture. A third company may 
request access to NGA. Access 
charge determined after the 
investment decision by either the 
regulator or the co-investing firms. 
 Basic investment sharing is preferable in 
terms of competition and investment 
incentives with respect to joint venture 
 Result still holds in presence of a third firm 
 Ex ante regulation avoids foreclosure, but it 
reduces investment incentives 
Bourreau et 
al. 
(2013) 
Two incumbents may form a joint 
venture or duplicate investment. 
Demand uncertainty. Investment 
costs differ across regions. 
 Joint investment allows lower costs per firm, 
but leads to tacit downstream collusion  
 Access obligations avoid downstream 
collusion, but incentives for co-investment 
are negatively affected 
 Co-investment increases NGA coverage in 
case of high service differentiation and/or 
cost savings 
 Mandated access reduces incentives for co-
investment 
 Voluntary access provision provides larger 
infrastructure but less competition 
The Impact of deregulatory regimes on investment incentives – RQ(ii): 
Vareda  
(2011)  
Incumbent first sets quality of 
NGAN. Entrant can decide to invest 
or request access. Two-part access 
tariff set by regulator. Entrant may 
still invest later if it first requests 
access.  
 
 Higher incumbent’s initial investment delays 
entrant’s investment  
 Welfare improvement if access charge is set 
according to business-stealing effect of 
quality upgrades 
 Under declining investment cost, 
deregulation could be better for society than 
access regulation 
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Author(s) Main assumptions Main results
The Impact of deregulatory regimes on investment incentives – RQ(ii): 
Nitsche & 
Wiethaus 
(2011) 
Both firms may investment. 
Incumbent is first-mover. Uncertain 
demand. 
 Regulatory holidays lead to highest 
investment incentives 
 Consumer surplus lower than with risk 
sharing  
Flacher & 
Jennequin 
(2014) 
Multiple firms, representative 
types differ in ability to invest in 
NGAN or only demand access. Co-
existence of old technology. NGA 
investment may differ 
geographically. Benevolent and 
fully informed regulator.  
 No regulation provides a welfare 
improvement over ex post access price 
regulation 
 Investment incentives and welfare 
maximized if both investment and access 
charge are determined by benevolent and 
fully informed regulator 
Table 4: Empirical analysis on competition policies 
Author(s) Methodology Setting Main results
The impact of co-investment models on investment incentives – RQ(i): 
Bourreau et 
al.  
(2010) 
Qualitative 
(case study) 
FTTH plans of France, Italy 
and Portugal are examined 
and compared. 
 Cooperation between competitors 
planned/in existence in all 
countries, but only regulated in 
France 
 Different approaches desirable 
Krämer & 
Vogelsang 
(2012) 
Experiment Network competition game 
with three regions and 
different investment costs. 
Local access regulation. 
Asymmetric firms. 
 Co-investment did not lead to 
higher NGA coverage due to tacit 
collusion 
 Co-investment occurred in 50% of 
feasible cases 
The Impact of deregulatory regimes on investment incentives – RQ(ii): 
Henze et al. 
(2012) 
Experiment One network operator 
invests in capacity for which 
other firms are bidding in an 
auction. They can then sell in 
growing downstream market. 
 Regulatory holidays induce 
underinvestment 
 Price cap generates capacity 
investment which is close to social 
optimum 
Yoo 
(2014) 
Qualitative 
(case study) 
U.S. and European countries 
are compared at the country 
level as regards NGA and LTE 
deployment. 
 U.S. style deregulatory approaches 
appear to be more efficient in 
terms inducing NGA and LTE 
deployments 
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5 Impact of public subsidies 
Public authorities seem to become more and more inclined to see high-speed broadband 
infrastructure as a necessary policy tool to attract and retain more business and to 
increase the competitiveness of their countries, regions and municipalities. Hence, a 
further main point of discussion is the role of national and regional governments as well as 
municipalities in promoting the necessary funding of NGA deployment projects. In most of 
the leading East-Asian fibre countries major public funding programs have already been 
put in place for years (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013). A similar huge public intervention can be 
observed in Australia, where the NGAN is constructed with public funds only, and New 
Zealand, where the NGAN is deployed through a public-private-partnership (PPP) between 
the national government and network operators (Given, 2010).16 The conjectured 
substantial and positive externalities accruing in major sectors of the economy represent 
the main economic argument for public subsidies. Although we review public NGA 
subsidies in broad terms in this section, one should be aware of relevant conceptual 
distinctions at the institutional level: national state aid policies are largely meant to 
increase coverage/penetration in unprofitable (“white”) areas where societal benefits of 
NGA deployment are not fully reflected in the willingness to pay of customers and hence 
neither NGA nor LTE deployment takes place; in contrast, municipal aid is typically meant 
to increase coverage in “grey” areas – where competition is not effective enough – or even 
(or particularly) in “black” areas – where competitive market structures are already well-
established.17 Two further distinctive features of municipal aid are that it is often 
combined with synergies from road repairs or common ducts and that it is more likely to 
crowd-out private investment than white area subsidies.  
The main questions about public subsidies are whether the strong results on the positive 
externalities of first-generation infrastructure sufficiently extend to the move to NGA 
infrastructure in order to justify the funding costs (RQ(i)); if public subsidies crowd-out 
private investment (RQ(ii)); whether the expected positive impact of subsidies on NGA 
                                                            
16 Public subsidies can be targeted towards either the demand or the supply side. Direct demand-stimuli 
include fiscal instruments or vouchers for all or specific groups of consumers. Direct supply-side stimuli not 
only include non-refundable public funds or facilitated loans but also PPPs, where national governments 
play a coordination and partial financing role and where both types of partners contribute with certain 
comparative advantages. PPPs are the most common form of contemporary public NGA stimulus programs, 
because total investment requirements are normally beyond the scope of public subsidizing, which makes 
sharing of investment risks among the partners involved attractive (Cave & Martin, 2010, p. 3; Briglauer & 
Holzleitner, 2014, p. 9). 
17 For a more formal definition see the European Commission´s Guidelines for the application of state aid 
rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (European Commission 2013). Section 3.2.1 
of the Guidelines describe the distinction between white, grey and black areas for basic broadband networks 
and section 3.3.1 the distinction between white, grey and black areas for NGAN. 
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deployment and adoption does actually occur (RQ(iii)), and finally, if there is a differential 
impact associated with the different institutional designs of public policies (RQ(iv))? 
In sections 5.1 and 5.2 below, we review in ascending chronological order (within relevant 
sub-sections) the related theoretical and empirical literature. 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
Jullien, Pouyet and Sand-Zantman (2010) consider the effect of public investments by local 
governments on private investments under a national regulatory framework. The authors 
examine whether local government intervention in the network infrastructure should be 
limited so that private investments are not crowded out. Their basic model consists of the 
regulator, the incumbent and a local government, whereby the two latter agents interact in 
Bertrand competition if both invest in an upgraded network. The authors include the case 
of multiple districts in their model. Due to externalities the investment decision of the 
local government in one district may influence the profitability of the private investment in 
another district. Additionally, the authors take into account that the incumbent cannot 
always perfectly foresee the investment decision of the local government and therefore 
has to operate under asymmetric information. Lastly, the authors consider that the 
objectives of the regulator and the local government might diverge, as the regulator 
optimizes not only the municipal agents’ welfare. The authors conclude that public 
investment can be efficient in white areas, however, a ban of local government 
intervention can be welfare enhancing in grey areas in case of externalities, asymmetric 
information or conflicting goals between regulator and local governments. Accordingly, the 
national regulator has to bear these issues in mind when designing rules for the 
involvement of local authorities. 
Fredebeul-Krein and Knoben (2010) develop a financing model for NGAN that is, in 
particular, applicable to PPPs. Based on a conceptual framework the authors derive an 
investment/pricing model that takes into account the characteristics of NGA investment 
projects. Accordingly, the model accommodates long-term risk-sharing contracts with 
participation by private and public investors in order to address the NGA specific 
investment uncertainties. While the investor builds and maintains the network, the access 
seeker leases a pre-defined network capacity for a pre-defined period of time. The access 
seeker owns the right to use the capacity but has to pay for it irrespective of the actual 
usage. The model thus also takes into account the real option value of the access 
seeker/non-investor which is typically not the case under standard (cost-based) access 
regulation regimes. The authors argue that their investment/pricing model induces the 
highest possible investment incentive for all potential operators thus maximizing 
investment in otherwise non-profitable deployment areas.  
Briglauer and Holzleitner (2014) argue that the current funding practice of fixing ex ante 
targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on 
fibre-based communications services and the public authorities’ incomplete information 
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about the capital costs of the network provider. The authors analyze public financing of an 
NGAN in a region where such a network would not be commercially viable (white area) and 
derive an optimal linear sharing contract under the condition that the public authority has 
incomplete information about the NGA provider’s capital costs in the contracting stage. 
The authors show that it is more efficient to delegate the choice of the network expansion 
and quality characteristics to the network operator instead of exogenously pre-fixing 
deployment targets. Furthermore, such contracts can be readily implemented based on 
existing accounting data and it is not necessary to undertake any additional verification of 
cost or demand data.  
5.2 Empirical evidence 
To the best of our knowledge, there are currently no studies that employ quantitative 
analysis utilizing NGA specific data. For this reason, this section reviews (i) quantitative 
studies related to first-generation broadband markets as well as (ii) qualitative case 
studies related to NGA deployments.  
(i) Quantitative studies utilizing first generation broadband data  
Belloc, Nicita and Rossi (2012) are the first to examine the impact of public policies on 
broadband adoption by utilizing a dataset for 30 OECD countries that describes public 
funding measures, as well as the countries’ socio-economic and demographic conditions 
for the years from 1995 to 2010. The authors estimate the effect on broadband adoption in 
a cross-country panel regression model by firstly performing a random-effects estimation 
and secondly a quantile regression analysis. With the latter technique, the authors 
demonstrate that the positive and statistically significant effect of demand-side policies is 
higher when the broadband adoption is already developed, while the effect of supply-side 
policies decreases as the broadband market moves into its later stages. The authors 
therefore argue that policy makers should prepare measures by choosing out of available 
supply-side and demand-side policies which suit the government’s goals and the 
country’s broadband stage. The authors propose that demand-side policies, in particular, 
should be taken in order to increase broadband adoption, while the massive investment 
requirements of NGAN demand both kinds of policy.  
Paleologos and Polemis (2013) also utilize data for 30 OECD countries for the years from 
1988 to 2010 in order to examine the impact of the regulatory environment on 
telecommunications investments and economic growth controlling for the industry 
structure and competition in the market. The authors employ a broadly defined regulatory 
variable that captures a country´s legal framework, the extent of sector-specific regulation 
as well as state interventionism. The empirical results are firstly obtained through a two-
stage generalized least squares fixed-effects method to estimate the static model. 
Secondly, the authors perform a dynamic generalized method of moments, as well as co-
integration analysis. The authors find that the regulatory variable, as measured by the 
OECD “Regulatory Reform Index”, has a significantly positive effect on both the level of 
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investments and economic growth in both the static and the dynamic model 
specifications. The authors therefore propose that in order to achieve the goal of increased 
investments, policy makers have to actively promote competition which also involves the 
use of public funding measures.  
Montolio and Trillas (2013) measure how the level of broadband adoption is affected by 
the impact of regulation, the degree of centralization of regulatory decisions as well as 
industrial policy. The authors employ an industrial policy variable that stands as a proxy 
for public policies devoted to foster broadband penetration and is calculated as 
government subsidies to private and public companies as percentage of GDP. The authors 
utilize data sets for OECD and EU countries for the years from 1999 to 2006. Estimations 
are based on ordinary fixed-effects as well as instrumental variables fixed-effects panel 
regressions. The estimation results indicate a positive, albeit insignificant, effect of 
subsidies in all model specifications; however, the authors concede that the quality of the 
available data might not allow for a perfect test of the hypotheses which are derived from a 
simple theoretical framework. 
(ii) Qualitative studies related to NGA funding  
Sadowski, Nucciarelli and de Rooij (2009) examine the potential of PPPs to stimulate 
private operators to participate in deploying municipal FTTH networks. The authors focus 
on the specific case of a single PPP project in the Netherlands, called “Ons Net” in the city 
of Nuenen. In 2005, the viability of this PPP project was tested in an experimental setting 
using public subsides. The authors analyse the objectives, boundaries and viability of the 
project and find that PPPs are an effective way to attract private investment for deploying 
municipal fibre networks. Indeed, their techno-economic analysis shows that the 
experience of Nuenen served as a blueprint for other municipal networks as for instance in 
Eindhoven, Helmond or Amsterdam. The authors emphasize the role of subsidies and 
semi-public institutions through which commercial risk could be shared. The experiment 
was not only able to create a viable case for Nuenen, but it also created enough knowledge 
about cost and adoption requirements so that PPPs became viable in other municipalities 
even if there were already two or more competing networks existent.  
Kenny and Kenny (2011) provide another case study examining whether public subsidies 
promoting high-end fibre roll-out in terms of FTTH network deployment goes along with 
sufficient societal benefits. The authors critically review the main arguments in favour of 
funding FTTH roll-outs and find that proponents often inappropriately attribute benefits of 
basic broadband services to FTTH-based services or attribute benefits of specific consumer 
segments, such as business premises, to all connected homes. Overall, societal benefits 
would be overstated. According to the authors there is no convincing evidence that 
subsidising high-cost FTTH roll-outs is justified by sufficient incremental externalities over 
other forms of NGA or first-generation broadband scenarios. Accordingly, the authors 
express concern that public policy makers might engage in over-ambitious and welfare 
reducing funding activities.  
[27] 
5.3 Conclusions on public funding policies 
Table 5 and 6 summarize the main research topics, findings and methodologies employed 
in the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
From the theoretical literature one can infer that public NGA subsidies entail the danger of 
crowding-out private investment (RQ(ii)) and that the current funding practice involves 
contracting inefficiencies in view of asymmetric information, externalities, risk allocation 
and conflicting goals between public entities (RQ(iv)). Given these warnings identified in 
the existing theoretical literature, one should opt for a narrowly defined role for 
governments in subsidizing NGAN: The efficient amount of government intervention 
should be determined endogenously in response to actual costs and demand and 
restricted to white areas taking account of risk-sharing elements and externalities. In grey 
areas funding activities of municipalities may create an efficiency trade-off by crowding 
out private investment but also delivering substantial cost advantages. 
Empirical econometric evidence has only just developed and is available only with respect 
to first-generation broadband infrastructure so far. The results indicate a positive impact 
of public subsidy programs (RQ(iii)) and that policy makers should be aware that demand 
and supply-side stimuli might have differential effects depending on the market phase 
(RQ(iv)). From the available NGA related case studies one can infer that supply-stimuli in 
terms of PPPs might be a success (RQ(iv)) but also that high-cost intense FTTH 
deployments still lack conclusive evidence of sufficient incremental societal benefits to 
justify public subsidies (RQ(iii)).  
Vogelsang (2013, pp. 29-30; 2014, pp. 248-252) argues that NGA funding programs can be 
regarded as a new type of universal service policy which gradually supersedes traditional 
universal service policies in conjunction with ubiquitous mobile (2G or higher) penetration 
in most developed countries. However, as the author remarks, such policies should be 
restricted to white areas and targeted for the poor. Even in those cases the efficiency of 
NGA funding programs remains doubtful in view of the increasing availability of mobile 
broadband (3G or higher) services. In order to minimize inefficiencies, the author further 
argues that NGA deployment based on state ownership should be restricted to the civil 
infrastructure level because of economies of scope with municipal networks. Furthermore, 
universal service funding should be based on an efficient tendering process that includes 
all relevant NGA technologies as well as LTE to provide a minimum amount of coverage 
and quality of high-speed broadband at lowest total costs. 
It is important to recall that public subsidies for NGA deployment are subject to the basic 
premise that they are socially desirable. This could be justified by positive externalities of 
existing broadband infrastructure in conjunction with the expectation that externalities 
will carry over to NGA infrastructure. However, according to our reading of the literature, 
there is no evidence available so far that externalities and spill-over effects beyond those 
associated with broadband networks will emerge under NGAN (RQ(i)).  
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Table 5: Theoretical analysis on public subsidy policies 
Author(s) Main assumptions Main results
Impact of public subsidies on private investment incentives – RQ(ii) 
Jullien et al.  
(2010) 
Both operators and local 
government may invest in NGAN. 
 Banning public intervention can be welfare-
enhancing in grey areas 
Impact of institutional designs of public subsidies on investment incentives – RQ(iv) 
Fredebeul-
Krein & Knoben  
(2010) 
Demand and regulatory 
uncertainty.  
 Investment risks sharing enhances NGA 
deployment and wholesale competition 
Briglauer & 
Holzleitner  
(2014) 
Demand uncertainty. Asymmetric 
information about capital cost and 
demand. 
 Endogenous NGA provider choice of network 
expansion is more efficient 
 Linear profit-sharing contracts incentivize NGA 
investment and minimize public subsidies 
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Table 6: Empirical analysis on public subsidy policies 
Author(s) Data & period Methodology Main results 
Quantitative studies related to first-generation broadband funding – RQ(iii): 
Belloc et al.  
(2012) 
30 OECD 
countries 
1995-2010 
Country-level 
Random effects and 
quantile regression using 
static model specifications. 
 Public policies positively affect 
broadband penetration in 
advanced stages of diffusion 
Paleologos & 
Polemis  
(2013) 
30 OECD 
countries  
1988-2010 
Country-level  
Static and dynamic models 
using two-stage generalized 
least squares fixed-effects 
and generalized method of 
moments regression. 
 Subsidies positively and strongly 
correlated with investments and 
economic growth 
 Privatization may incentivize 
investments 
Montolio & 
Trillas  
(2013) 
OECD/EU 
countries 
1999-2006 
Country-level 
Estimations based on static 
fixed-effects and 
instrumental variables fixed-
effects panel regression. 
 Public subsidies are weakly 
positively correlated with 
broadband deployment 
 Centralization has no or negative 
impact on broadband penetration 
 Decentralized policies may be 
required with vertical and 
horizontal coordination 
Quantitative studies related to first-generation broadband funding – RQ(iv): 
Belloc et al.  
(2012) 
30 OECD 
countries 
1995-2010 
Country-level 
Random effects and 
quantile regression using 
static model specifications. 
 Demand-side policies positively 
affect broadband penetration in 
advanced stages of diffusion 
 Countries' initial conditions are 
relevant in policy choices 
Qualitative studies related to NGA funding – RQ(iii) and RQ(iv): 
Sadowski et al. 
(2009) 
Nuene District 
(Netherland) 
2005 
Municipal-level 
Techno-economic analysis.  PPPs are effective in deploying 
municipal NGAN  
Qualitative studies related to NGA funding – RQ(i) and RQ(iii): 
Kenny & Kenny  
(2011) 
Literature review Critical appraisal of pro-NGA 
arguments. 
 Social benefits may not be 
enough to justify FTTH subsidies 
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6 Overall conclusions, future research and policy recommendations 
Our analysis indicates that the extent of the NGA related theoretical and empirical 
literature differs widely depending on the specific policies. Whereas numerous theoretical 
studies related to the impact of access regulations exist, only a much less pronounced 
branch of literature relates to the impact of competition policies, and even fewer studies 
analyse the impact of public subsidies on NGA deployment. Moreover, empirical studies 
are few in number, in particular regarding the assessment of competition policies and 
public subsidies. Those existing empirical studies hardly provide direct evidence on the 
predictions of the theoretical contributions. The latter, in turn, do not take into account 
some of the key features related to investment incentives so far. For instance, none of the 
reviewed contributions explicitly models the impact of expectations related to future 
market structures (e.g., collusion vs. Bertrand competition) and future regulatory policies 
(e.g., cost-based regulation vs. deregulatory policies and regulatory commitment) on ex 
ante investment incentives. Overall, our survey indicates that the current literature 
exhibits some substantial research gaps. For instance, future theoretical research should 
examine the welfare implications of policy measures. Future empirical research should 
also be based on firm-level data that allows tests of differential investment incentives and 
strategic effects as predicted by the theoretical literature. 
Nevertheless, our analysis enables us to derive some generic policy guidance based on 
the comparative efficiency of the relevant policies examined. Since our policy 
recommendations are necessarily subject to several trade-offs (Krämer & Schnurr 2014) 
and depend on local conditions, they are based on a counterfactual approach (Cave 2014). 
As stated in section 3, the European regulatory framework currently foresees ex ante 
access obligations to be imposed on NGA infrastructure which thus represents the relevant 
status quo in Europe. In view of our discussion of the individual policies available the 
following alternatives to induce NGA investment emerge: i) deregulatory approaches 
including co-investment models subject to competition law, ii) reliance on public 
subsidies to cover white areas subject to the admissibility criteria of national and 
international competition law,18 and iii) combinations of i) and ii). Obviously, the 
assessment of these alternatives will depend on the competitive intensity in relevant 
markets and regions in terms of subnational markets as well as on the effectiveness of 
competition law and LTE as the relevant outside options.19  
                                                            
18 In addition, whenever NGA roll-out projects are (co-)financed by public subsidies within EU member states, 
then such co-operations (e.g. PPPs) must also adhere to the principles of State aid control for public service 
contracts following from Art. 106 and 107 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU, as well as the specific 
broadband/NGA state aid guidelines (European Commission, 2009). 
19 As already indicated in section 2, standard wireline broadband products represent relevant substitutes for 
some consumer segments and thus also exert some competitive constraints for NGA pricing. 
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i) If the competitive intensity is deemed sufficient (black areas), then this alternative 
becomes the gold standard. The U.S. experience shows that an almost nation-wide 
duopoly infrastructure can be sufficient to ensure competition and trigger investment 
(Cave, 2014). This applies even more so if NGA deployment attracts new market players 
such as forward integrating municipalities or energy utilities in some European states or 
backward integrating Internet content providers like Google in the U.S. Furthermore, 
duopoly infrastructure or narrow oligopolies do not have to be established on a full nation-
wide scale, if infrastructure operators are e.g. subject to a uniform pricing constraint that 
arises from retail demand or if they engage in a race to pre-empt each other or if they face 
pricing constraints from mobile broadband operators (LTE) which typically can cover areas 
where no parallel CATV infrastructure exists. The empirical literature as well as the 
theoretical models have considered duplication of NGA infrastructure resulting in NGA 
duopolies or narrow NGA oligopolies. One would expect that NGA oligopolies induce 
higher NGA investment in general which is preferable in case of high externalities arising 
from the NGA deployment.20 In turn, NGA duopolies would be preferable over wider 
oligopolies in case of low NGA externalities or when costs of additional infrastructure 
duplication are higher than welfare gains from product differentiation.  
The number of investing operators is also crucial for assessing the role of co-investment 
models in grey areas. Whereas co-investment largely avoids fixed cost duplication in case 
of several independent NGA deployments, it also evolves the danger of collusion among 
co-investing operators. A higher number of co-investors makes collusion less likely but 
also imposes a negative externality on the other members of the co-investment in terms of 
lower individual market shares and hence higher costs per user (Rendon Schneir & Xiong 
2013). Assessing the overall impact of co-investment as an alternative in an unregulated 
setting is limited to experimental and anecdotal evidence so far. This alternative becomes 
more attractive if the above-mentioned intra- and intermodal competitive safe-guards are 
present and if co-investing parties have comparative cost advantages; the latter might be 
due to the prior ownership of passive infrastructure elements on the side of municipalities 
or utilities. In the absence of these conditions and if collusion ex post is likely, then ex 
ante NGA access obligations (or geographically differentiated access regulations in 
subnational markets) appear to be still necessary and justified.  
ii) Provided strong enough externalities or spill-over effects exist, public subsidies are 
justified to cover white areas where private network deployment is not profitable even in 
case of a monopoly and where there is no danger to crowd-out private investment. 
Although access regulations typically include white areas at least formally, they appear to 
                                                            
20 Lestage and Flacher (2014) examine infrastructure investment and access regulation distinguishing three 
different liberalization stages. The authors show that in the last stage of liberalization, where incumbent and 
entrant play a symmetric investment game, it might be socially optimal for a regulator to set access charges 
to promote infrastructure-based competition, even if operators tend to overinvest. The last stage with 
symmetric investment decisions appears to be a realistic description in view of NGA deployment conditions. 
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be practically ineffective in those regions in terms of inducing NGA investment. Hence, 
public subsidies represent a relevant and complementary alternative which might, but not 
necessarily should (Briglauer & Holzleitner 2014), be accompanied by further third party 
access obligations. An extreme case is the governmental involvement in Australia and New 
Zealand (Given 2010) where NGAN operators are subjected to vertical separation 
obligations which imply long-term ex ante access regulation. In case of vertical integration 
the regulator is also confronted with a wholesale monopoly but the operator might be 
subject to retail pricing constraints or compete at the retail level with substitute products 
in the mid-term. 
iii) Ideally, policy combinations within i) and between i) and ii) specifically oriented for 
white, grey and black areas present even stronger alternatives to the current status quo of 
NGA access regulations. At this point it is necessary to note that the academic literature so 
far provides no guidance on the role of this counterfactual policy mix. Table 7 provides a 
synopsis which maps the different competitive areas (column 1) with the available policy 
options based on respective market structures (column 2). Column 3 reports the effect of 
policy options on expected investment where we assign ordinal values on the basis of the 
related empirical literature (section 3.2) which shows quite unambiguously that stronger 
regulation implies lower ex ante NGA investment incentives. In case of white areas we 
assume that the extent of the public subsidy is exogenous and hence expected investment 
is only dependent on the degree of ex ante regulations. Finally, column 4 presents a 
ranking of policy combinations based on expected externalities. According to the empirical 
literature review in section 5.2, there is no conclusive evidence available so far that NGA 
deployment also involves high externalities. Hence, we simply distinguish two broad 
cases in column 4 where high expected externalities imply that policy makers should focus 
on dynamic efficiency and incentivise investment. In turn, if expected externalities are low, 
than policies should be primarily based on static efficiency. Note that the categorisation of 
white, grey and black areas is endogenously determined by the chosen policy options and 
the expectations of policy makers.  
Since policy choices crucially depend on expectations of the respective decision makers, 
the underlying information should be based on empirical evidence and rigorous analysis 
(Mayo, 2013). Our work has identified the main research gaps and trade-offs involved in 
the alternative policy options which should give some purposeful impulses for future 
research. 
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Table 7: Synopsis of policy alternatives 
Area Policies based on competitive intensity
and competition law 
Expected 
investment 
Ranking of policy decisions 
based on expected 
externalities 
W
hi
te
 
Subsidized monopoly is vertically integrated 
(VI) =>  
 access regulation: competition law is 
weak 
 soft regulation: competition law is 
strong 
Subsidized monopoly is vertically separated 
(VS) =>  
 access regulation: irrespective of 
competition law 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
 
Low 
 
Expected externalities are high =>
1) VI and soft regulation 
2) VI and access regulation*) 
3) VS and access regulation 
Expected externalities are low => 
No public subsidies: only low 
cost NGA/LTE funding based 
on universal service doctrine 
Gr
ey
 
Monopoly operator (M) => 
 access regulation: LTE and 
competition law is weak 
 soft regulation: LTE and/or 
competition law is strong 
 no regulation: LTE and competition 
law is strong 
Co-investing operators (CI) => 
 access regulation: LTE and 
competition law are weak and 
collusion expected 
 soft regulation: LTE and competition 
law are weak but no collusion 
expected 
 no regulation: LTE and competition 
law are strong and no collusion 
expected 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
High 
Expected externalities are high =>
1) CI and no regulation 
2) M and no regulation 
3) CI and soft regulation 
4) M and soft regulation 
5) CI and access regulation 
6) M and access regulation*) 
Expected externalities are low => 
Trade-off: avoidance of 
inefficient infrastructure 
duplication of co-investors 
vs. comparative cost 
advantage of co-investors 
Bl
ac
k 
Duopoly (D) => 
 soft regulation: LTE and competition 
law are weak and collusion expected 
 no regulation: LTE and/or competition 
law is strong or uniform pricing 
constraint 
Oligopoly (O) => 
 no regulation: irrespective of LTE and 
competition law 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
 
High 
Expected externalities are high =>
1) O and no regulation 
2) D and no regulation 
3) D and soft regulation*) 
Expected externalities are low => 
1) D and soft regulation*) 
2) D and no regulation 
3) O and no regulation 
*) Since these options are based on weak competition law/LTE, better options may not be available for those 
regions/countries.  
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